250 / PARADOXES OF FORCED LABOR leaders during the 18505. As sectional tensions mounted Southerners became increasingly alarmed by federal policies which they thought were giving economic advantage to the North. They also became increasingly impatient. with what they thought was an insufl-lciently active role by their state and local governments to promote internal improvements and to embrace other policies that would accelerate the southern rate of economic growth. To generate a sense of urgency southern newspapers, journals, economic leaders, and politicians continuously emphasized every new eco- nomic attainment of the North and every unrealized objec- tive of the South, every northern advantage and every southern disadvantage. The abolitionist critique on the issue of development was lifted — lock, stock, and barrel — from southern editorials, speeches, and commercial proclama- tions, sometimes with acknowledgments (as in Olmsted), sometimes without (as in Helper). Table 5 The Relative Level 01 the Per Capita Income of the south in 1860 (Southern per capita income level : 100) Australia 144 Belgium 92 Italy 49 North ,~lfl.0._.. France 82 Austria 41 Great Britain 126 Ireland 71 Sweden 41 South .100. Denmark 70 Japan 14 Switzerland 100 Germany 67 Mexico 10 Canada 96 Norway 54 India 9 Netherlands 93 _ The myth of southern backwardness and stagnation thus arose not because of any lack in the southern economic ECONONLIC GROWTH IN rm: scorn, 1840-1860 / 251 achievement but because the northern achievement was so remarkable, and because the continuous comparisons be- tween the North and South were invariably unfavorable to the South. Compared with any country of Europe except England, however, the South’s economic performance was quite strong. That comparison was never invoked by the abolitionists because it made the wrong point. It was rarely invoked by the Southerners because it would encourage com- placency when urgency was called for. Table 4 also shows that far from stagnating, per capita income was actually growing 30 percent more rapidly in the South than the North. The South's rate of growth was so rapid (1.7 percent per annum), that it constitutes prima facie evidence against the thesis that slavery retarded southern growth. Since few nations have achieved a rate of growth as high as 1.7 percent per annum over sustained periods, those who continue to advance the retardation thesis are implying that in the absence of slavery, the progress of the antebellum South would have exceeded virtually all recorded experience over the past 159 years. France, for example, experienced an-averagelgrovvth rate of 1. 55 percent per annum over a 103-year period ending in 1960. Over similar periods the growth rate of the United Kingdom was 1.2 percent and Germany’s was 1.43 per- cent. The long—term annual growth rate for the U.S. as a whole has averaged 1.6 percent. Only Sweden and Japan have been able to sustain long-term growth rates substan- tially in excess of that achieved by the antebellum South between 1840 and 1860. When one disaggregates the southern rate of growth by subregions, it turns out that growth within each of the three subregions was less than the growth rate of the South as a whole. This is because part of the South’s growth was due to the redistribution of southern population from the older ‘states to the newer ones, particularly to Texas and the other rich states of the west central subregion. It will be noted that